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Abstract 
The paper starts with the discussion of the distinction between proper and common names, and then moves on to examine the 
specific nature of the names in literature and the mistakes that are often made when translating them. Among other things, it is 
argued that proper and common names may both have a reference and a meaning, but that they refer and mean in a dissimilar way.  
The translator should be aware of these differences, as well as understand that literature creates an alternative reality, and hence 
the task of the translator is to read the name as an intertextual fragment and analyze the associations – linguistic and literary – in 
order to see the system of that fragment and render it in the TL accordingly.  
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1. Introduction 
Onomastics has struggled for centuries to define its subject: there is a wide range of contradictory definitions of a 
proper name, but neither seems to give a definitive answer about its essence and relation to the referent. A Hellenistic 
grammarian Dionysius Thrax is credited to be the first to distinguish between proper and common nouns in his treatise 
The Art of Grammar, saying that a proper noun signifies “a peculiar substance” (1874, p. 333). However, the paradox 
of a proper noun is such that its definition became problematic even before it had been defined. Plato did not 
distinguish between proper and common nouns, but, in Cratylus, written a few centuries before The Art of Grammar, 
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he had called this distinction into question by raising an important issue of whether a proper noun can have a meaning. 
2. Common and proper nouns 
A common noun is used both to designate a concrete object or notion as well as imply some attribute that is shared 
by all the objects or notions called by it.1 A proper noun, on the contrary, is used only to name a specific living or 
non-living thing, place, or idea. In other words, a proper noun is, as Mill claimed, a meaningless mark used to 
distinguish one thing from another (1967, p. 17). Let us take, for example, the common noun ‘chair’. Chairs can be 
different, but, whatever their design, they share the attribute of having a back, a seat and legs. If we compare this with 
the proper noun ‘John’, then all people under the name ‘John’ seem to have nothing in common and are called by such 
a name purely arbitrarily. Therefore, a proper noun is usually said to have a reference, while a common noun may 
have both a reference and meaning.   
2.1. Meaning of proper names 
The arbitrariness of a proper name, however, seems problematic. Theoretically, you can call your daughter ‘John’, 
but mostly Johns are male and of Anglo-Saxon background. Therefore, ‘John’ has a certain meaning, and in this it 
does not differ from common nouns, such as, for instance, ‘chair’. In an influential monograph dedicated to defining 
the proper name, John Algeo states that “a word’s meaning is the set of conditions under which it can be used 
appropriately” (1973, p. 51) – it hence would be inappropriate to call a piece of furniture with a back, a seat and legs 
a ‘lamp’, as the word ‘lamp’ is used to designate objects that produce light, i.e. this word has a different meaning. At 
the same time, it would also seem inappropriate to call a girl by the name ‘John’, as this name is usually used under a 
different set of conditions. Would it not, therefore, be legitimate to say that as the words ‘lamp’ and ‘table’ have 
different meanings, so the names ‘Mary’ and ‘John’ imply different things and thus have different meanings even if 
we do not know the people they refer to? 
Since Plato raised this question for the first time in his Cratylus, onomastics, philosophy, logic and semantics have 
attempted to answer it in two distinctive ways. Some say that such proper names as ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ are ‘incorrect’ 
or ‘less pure’, while others claim that ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ are not names at all (see Hramova, 2009, p. 11–22). In ‘The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, Bertrand Russell states that a proper name is the only kind of word “capable of 
standing for a particular” (1918, p. 523) and, as a result, its meaning is a particular.  According to Russell and some 
other logicians, such as W. V. Quine (1960), “you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with” (Russell, 1918, 
p. 523; see also Russell, 1940, p. 37), and if you do, you do not name but describe. In other words, ‘John’ is a name 
only if it denotes a certain John who exists, and then this particular John is the meaning of the name. On the other 
hand, if we talk about John Donne, Sir John Falstaff or John Bull, ‘John’ in such cases is not simply a meaningless 
name – it is not a name at all because no object corresponds to it (Quine, 1960, p. 180), and hence it is a description.  
 Criticizing Russell’s failure to distinguish between meaning and reference, R. J. Nelson states that “names mean, 
even though they might not refer” (1992, p. 13), and gives Cerberus as an example of a name that “does not name 
anything, although it means a three-headed dog” (4). Nelson is certainly right in stating that by using ‘meaning’ where 
most would prefer to use ‘reference’, Russell creates confusion. However, he himself does not take into consideration 
that for Russell, Cerberus would not be a name, because, though he did not make a distinction between meaning and 
reference, a name for him, as for Mill, is obviously a word that refers to a particular or, using Mill’s terminology, 
denotes something particular but does not have a connotation. Thus Cerberus, despite designating a unique entity, 
cannot be a name since we are not acquainted with a three-headed dog it describes.  
Nevertheless, Bertrand Russell’s reasoning is not without fault, as it does not explain how a name can refer and at 
the same time have a meaning.  Whatever terms we use, it is clear that my neighbor’s name ‘John’ is something 
Bertrand Russell would call a name, while John Donne’s name is something he would claim to be a description. It is 
not important whether my neighbor is a referent or a meaning of ‘John’, as it is rather a question of preferring one 
 
 
1 For a more detailed discussion of this see Hramova, 2009, p. 11-22. 
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term over another and does not seem to make much difference for what Russell tries to argue. What remains unclear, 
however, is how ‘John’ – taken in isolation and belonging to both my neighbor and John Donne – can connote the 
attributes of both Johns, namely their shared quality of being male and Anglo-Saxon. Thus, proper names seem to 
have a certain meaning that does not depend on our acquaintance with the referent. 
2.2. ‘Pure’ and ‘less pure’ names 
There is also a group of scholars that takes a slightly different position from that argued by Russell. In The Theory 
of Proper Names: A Controversial Essay, Alan Gardiner seems to agree with Russell and Quine by claiming that 
“when we speak of a ‘name’ we imply that there exists something to which a certain sound-sign corresponds” (1954, 
p. 7). However, he also admits that there are names that “on rare occasions, [...] might give [assistance] by their 
suggestion of sex, nationality, or country” or by having a clear etymology, and as such they are “slightly less pure 
examples of the category than completely arbitrary and unintelligible names” (1954, p. 42). Thus, for Gardiner, names 
may be divided into ‘pure’ names, when they are arbitrary and denotative, and ‘less pure’ names, when they seem to 
suggest a kind of meaning and are therefore connotative. There are, however, more occasions when a name has a 
connotative meaning than Gardiner would like to believe. First of all, the cases when a proper name – and by this I 
mean any proper name – would not imply a certain meaning, either by means of a clear etymology or connoting some 
attributes that the referents share, are so rare that one is bound to believe that arbitrariness and ‘purity’ are not inherent 
in the name’s nature and are rather exceptional. Secondly, the notion of connotation is in itself very ambiguous; hence 
the existence of non-connotative or ‘pure’ names is open to question. For example, a person not knowing the Latvian 
language would also not know that the word maize means ‘bread’ or, using Mill’s terminology, would be unaware 
what the word connotes. By the same token, a person not having a command of Latvian would not know that the name 
‘Jānis’ implies that the referent is male and Latvian.  
Therefore, the connotative meaning of both common and proper names seems to depend on our knowledge of a 
certain language rather than on anything else. In this sense ‘pure’ names are not very much different from ‘less pure’ 
ones, as their ‘purity’ depends on the level at which we command a language. Hence, a geographical name ‘Prusaki’ 
would be a meaningless and thus ‘pure’ name for non-speakers of Latvian, although it has a very clear etymology and 
means ‘cockroaches’. The surname of a famous French film director Alain Resnais, on the contrary, has an obscure 
etymology. Nevertheless, it never fails to make Latvians smile, because for them it has a clear connection to the 
Latvian word resnais, which is a form of resns ‘fat’. Consequently, it is in most cases very difficult and perhaps even 
impossible to determine whether a name fulfils its role as a proper name, or whether it suggests a certain meaning and 
in this way is connotative and ‘less pure’. 
2.3. Comparison of proper and common names 
Taking into consideration the above observations, it seems legitimate to claim that proper names might have – and 
often do have – both a reference and a meaning. This, however, raises another question: if the proper name can be 
used to designate a concrete object as well as imply some attribute that is shared by all the objects bearing the same 
name, in what, then, lies the difference between the proper and common name. First of all, it must be mentioned that, 
in traditional terms, there is indeed no difference between the proper and common name – both, as it has been 
mentioned earlier, are linguistic forms that have a reference and a meaning. These forms, however, refer and mean in 
a different way. Alan Gardiner observed that “when we speak of a ‘word’ our minds travel from the sound-sign to 
whatever it may mean; when we speak of a ‘name’ we imply that there exists something to which a certain sound-sign 
corresponds, something that was the fons et origo of the name, something that supplies it raison d’être” (1954, p. 7). 
As we have seen, it is not necessary for the referent to exist in order to have a name, but one can agree with Gardiner 
– a proper name should have a raison d’être, otherwise it is not a proper name, because an entity cannot have a name 
if it is not named. In other words, the meaning of a proper name should be ascribed and the reference should be 
established by the act of naming, while the meaning of a common name is already a fact of language and needs to be 
accepted and learned.  
162   Tatjana Hramova /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  231 ( 2016 )  159 – 164 
3. ‘Embodied’ and ‘disembodied’ names 
It is, however, not enough to understand the difference between proper and common names. In order to identify 
the subject of onomastics, Alan Gardiner also distinguished between the two categories of proper names, which he 
called ‘embodied’ and ‘disembodied’ names (1954, p. 8–10).  As John Algeo (1973, p. 51–52) observed, the 
distinction is crucial for both theoretical and practical reasons, for it clearly declares the boundaries of onomastic 
studies – only ‘disembodied’ names, that is to say, names taken in isolation from their referents, can be the subject of 
onomastics. ‘Embodied’ names, on the other hand, are of no interest to the philologist and should be treated in 
encyclopedias, gazetteers, biographical dictionaries and the like, which consider “not the word itself but the things 
named by it” (ibid.).  
3.1. Names in literature 
Unfortunately, there have hardly been any attempts to define the subject of literary onomastics, which obviously 
cannot be the same as that of onomastics. Literary onomastics deals with names in literary texts; as such, the very 
distinction between ‘embodied’ and ‘disembodied’ names becomes problematic. This happens because the 
relationship between the name and the referent is different in literature and external reality. Let us, for example, 
analyze the following sentence: 
 
             Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, committed suicide. 
 
If one heard or read this sentence in ‘real life’, one most probably would immediately establish a connection 
between a name ‘Angela Merkel’ and a real subject, hence deducing that the Chancellor of Germany is dead. On the 
contrary, if this sentence were found at the beginning of a novel or a story, hardly anyone would contact the 
Bundeskanzleramt to know whether it was true. Thus literature seems to create a space alternative to reality, where 
the referent of a name is always fictionalized. In other words, an Angela Merkel in a novel is not the same Angela 
Merkel who is now the chancellor of Germany. Indeed, literature may create thousands of different Angelas Merkels, 
as it has already created thousands of Napoleons and Godunovs. 
Therefore, in literature, a ‘physical’ subject is always transformed into an image, or rather, into one of many 
attributes of an image, into “[un] réseau impersonnel de symbols manié sous le nom propre” (Barthes, 1970, p. 101).2 
A name itself becomes an intermediate textual fragment that helps one, not to uncover ‘the truth’ about a character, 
but to follow the connotations in order to understand the system of that fragment (see ibid). In this way, for instance, 
when Samuel Beckett calls one of his characters Moll, he most probably does refer to his mother who had the same 
name.3 His mother, though, becomes only an attribute of the image of fictional Moll who has many other traits that 
Beckett’s mother might not have had. The poetics of the name Moll is not limited to the allusion to Beckett’s mother, 
and the name may also be seen to refer to Molly Bloom of James Joyce’s Ulysses, Moll Flanders, eponymous heroine 
of Daniel Defoe’s novel, the Virgin Mary and so forth.  
4. Translating names in literature 
In A Certain World: A Commonplace Book, W. H. Auden called proper names “poetry in the raw”, adding that, 
like all poetry, they were untranslatable. It is indeed true that ‘Angela Merkel’ or ‘John’ are untranslatable, but can 
we, therefore, claim that ‘Angel Merkel’ is “poetry in the raw”? As we have seen earlier, the difference between proper 
and common names lies in the way they mean and refer. At first sight, proper names seem poorer in terms of the 
meaning that they suggest. ‘John’ implies only that the referent is male (possibly) and Anglo-Saxon (possibly). It can 
hardly be compared to the implications of, for example, the common name ‘bread’.  
 
 
2 “an impersonal network of symbols combined under the proper name” (Barthes, 1974, p. 94). 
3 Moll is a long-established form of the name Mary (Hanks et al., 1996: 240). Beckett’s mother was christened as Maria Jones Roe (Knowlson, 
1996, p. 4). 
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The essence of poetry seems to be in the creation of new meanings to enhance our perception of the familiar things. 
Its closeness to a proper name is in the word ‘possibly’: just like a proper name, the meaning in poetry is always to a 
certain degree uncertain. The meaning is theoretically there, but practically a name-giver or a poet has the freedom to 
let it slip away. There is no such freedom when using common names in ‘real life’. Thus, a poet becomes a name-
giver and is granted poetic license to treat common names as if they were proper and ascribe them accordingly by the 
act of naming; because of this unique situation, poetry is indeed untranslatable.  
It is, however, not only the nature of common names that is changed when entering the world of fiction. Proper 
names are transformed as well; to a certain extent, they become closer to common names by growing richer in terms 
of meaning. The name Mary, when given to a character, should be interpreted differently than when given to a poet’s 
daughter. One can hardly say that a proper name has more meanings when used in fiction; it is rather that these 
meanings would become more meaningful in the unique poetic situation that the name is used. The poet’s daughter 
Mary might choose to be a Buddhist and care very little that she shares the same name with the mother of Jesus. Her 
Buddhist friends might not even know about this connection and this would not prevent them from using the name 
successfully when communicating with the poet’s daughter. However, it is hardly possible to understand a poem 
whose main character is called Mary if you know nothing about the Virgin Mary. Therefore, the association with the 
Virgin is true irrespective of whether the name is used in fiction or ‘real life’; in fiction, however, this association 
becomes more meaningful. Needless to say, the translator should be aware of this, being able to read the name as an 
intertextual fragment and analyze the associations – cultural, linguistic and literary – in order to see the system of that 
fragment and render it in the TL accordingly. 
Unfortunately, it rarely happens that the translator understands the complicated nature of proper names in fiction. 
Obviously, there are cases when names in a literary text are ‘embodied’; that is to say, when the referent is more 
important than the word itself. Such cases seem easier, because they demand from the translator only the knowledge 
of the source language and, as a consequence, of source culture. Nevertheless, mistakes in rendering ‘embodied’ 
names are not uncommon. For example, in Samuel Beckett’s Rough for Theatre II, a certain Smith (Dubois in the 
French version of the play) is said to have “a steady job in Marks and Spencer’s” (Beckett, 2006, p. 253). Marks and 
Spencer’s is an ‘embodied’ name, because, in this text, it has no poetic value and simply refers to a major retailer in 
Britain. Therefore, when A. Kuprin translated the phrase into Russian as ‘он старательно изучает Маркса и 
Спенсера’ (Беккет, 1999, p. 247),4  he made a mistake of not knowing the true referent of the name and substituting 
it for another one. 
More frequently, however, translators are not looking at a name from a ‘disembodied’ perspective, ignoring its 
poetic potential and thus disrupting the poetic unity of a text. As an example, one could take a 1994 Russian translation 
of Samuel Beckett’s novel Molloy, where V. Molot made several serious mistakes in rendering proper names. 
Substituting Edith for Юдифь (Russian equivalent of Judith) (Беккет, 1994, p. 59, 60) and Teddy for Чарли (Charlie) 
(32–37), the translator destroyed the associative field of the text for the Russian reader. While certain creativity on the 
part of the translator is welcome, he or she should never attempt to take the place of a name-giver, which belongs to 
the poet. 
5. Conclusion 
Proceeding from these observations, it may be concluded that proper names demand a different translation 
approach, depending on whether they are used in fiction or a real-life situation. In fiction, the meaning of a proper 
name often becomes as important – or probably more important – than the reference. As a result, it seems that proper 
names in fiction lose certain attributes and start acting improper, i.e. as an intertextual fragment that often helps to 
understand the system of the text. When translating fiction, the task of the translator is not only to establish the 
reference and render the proper name into the target language accordingly (‘embodied’ names), but also to uncover 




4  He studies Marx and Spencer thoroughly [meaning Karl Marx and probably Herbert Spencer]. 
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